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Procedural systems allow unique modes of authorship 
and singular aesthetic experiences. As creators and 
users of these systems, we need to be aware that 
their aesthetic potential is not solely defined by 
interaction but that interpretation, and the capacity to 
understand and simulate the processes taking place 
within these artefacts is highly significant. This paper 
argues that although direct interaction is usually the 
most discernible component in the relationship 
between ergodic artefacts and their users, ergodicity 
does not necessarily imply interaction. Non-interactive 
procedural artefacts may allow the development of 
ergodic experiences through interpretation, and the 
probing of the system by its reader through 
simulations. We try to set the grounds for designing 
towards virtuosic interpretation, an activity that we 
may describe as the ergodic experience developed by 
means of mental simulation through the development 
of theories of systems. 
KEYWORDS 
Ergodic; Interaction; Simulation; Aesthetics; 
Procedural Design; MDA; Vicarious Interaction; 
Interpretation. 
1 | INTERACTING WITH ERGODIC MEDIA 
As digital technologies become ubiquitous, they have 
been replacing previous media as economic and 
reliable alternatives. These technologies are excellent 
simulators of other media forms, but perhaps because 
of this, they often fall short of being developed to their 
highest potential for the creation of new media forms. 
The very definition we use for them is based on their 
digital encoding properties and fundamentally omits 
the fact that, being processor-based, these media 
forms are essentially procedural. 
These media may be developed in either data-
intensive or process-intensive approaches (Crawford, 
1987), the first of these devoting most of the 
resources to “moving bytes around” in artefacts that 
“are based primarily on pre-recorded sound and/or 
image sequences, or on static texts or images that 
are selected or arranged during the interaction” 
(Kwastek, 2013, p. 114) and mainly use their 
procedural capacities to select, rearrange, compose 
or give access to these assets. Conversely, a 
process-intensive approach tends to produce 
artefacts that “will be generated in real time according 
to algorithms” (Kwastek, 2013, p. 114) and where the 
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focus on procedurality remains clear, even when data-
intensive approaches are also used. 
We may therefore emphasize procedurality when 
designating these media as procedural rather than 
simply as digital, following Janet Murray’s first 
essential property (1997, p. 71) and her observation 
that a computer “is not fundamentally a wire or a 
pathway but an engine”, designed to “embody 
complex, contingent behaviors” (1997, p. 72).  
Authorship in these media is also procedural, a 
process where one writes “the rules by which the 
texts appear as well as writing the texts themselves”, 
devising “rules for the interactor's involvement” and 
“conditions under which things will happen in 
response to the participant's actions” (Murray, 1997, 
p. 152). This turns the author into something of “a 
choreographer who supplies the rhythms, the context, 
and the set of steps that will be performed” (1997, p. 
153), creating not sets, scenes, or objects, but rather 
potential narratives to be discovered and enacted. 
Procedural authorship also underlines, and takes 
advantage of, the “principal value of the computer, 
which creates meaning through the interaction of 
algorithms” (Bogost, 2008, p. 122), an ability that 
radically distinguishes them from other media and that 
turns them into a significantly different class of 
artefacts. 
In these media the role of the reader is also affected 
[1]. Murray describes how readers make use of a 
“repertoire of possible steps and rhythms to improvise 
a particular dance among the many, many possible 
dances the author has enabled” (1997, p. 153) and 
how this leads to the adoption of something of a 
creative role within the system, a role that is however 
not equivalent to that of the author, not even close 
enough to qualify as a co-authorship. Rather, she 
speaks of agency, the power “over enticing and 
plastic materials” (1997, p. 153) “to take meaningful 
action and see the results of our decisions and 
choices” (1997, p. 112), and distinguishes it from 
mere activity, seeing how it “goes beyond both 
participation” (1997, p. 128), and becomes an 
aesthetic pleasure in itself. 
Following Murray, Espen Aarseth (1997) speaks of the 
ergodic experience developed in artefacts where 
multiple user functions are possible to develop — an 
omnipresent interpretative function; an explorative 
function, in which decisions are made regarding which 
spaces of the text’s topology to access; a 
configurative function, in which textual contents may 
be created, selected or rearranged; and a textonic 
function, when contents may be permanently added 
to the text. He posits that artefacts where “a 
cybernetic feedback loop, with information flowing 
from text to user (through the interpretative function) 
and back again (through one or more of the other 
functions)” may be described as ergodic, a term 
“appropriated from physics that derives from ! the 
Greek words ergon and hodos, meaning ‘work’ and 
‘path’. In ergodic literature, nontrivial effort is required 
to allow the reader to traverse the text.” (Aarseth, 
1997, p. 1). From this definition of ergodic texts, we 
may consider that other media, where some of these 
user functions can be developed, can likewise be 
ergodic. 
Allowing for interaction and agency, these media 
forms will be characterized by a relatively 
unpredictable usage, with the number of user 
functions involved, and their relative weight in the 
experience of the media forms varying. Hunicke, 
LeBlanc and Zubek (2004) describe artefacts such as 
these in terms of three stages they call Mechanics, 
Dynamics and Aesthetics, developed consecutively 
during the artefact’s design and discovered in reverse 
order by their readers [2]. The perspectives of reader 
and author are therefore opposite in ergodic artefacts. 
The author deals primarily with mechanics, the code 
and data, and consequently with dynamics, the 
runtime behaviour of the mechanics previously 
developed, which will ultimately result, at the 
aesthetics level, and twice removed from the author, 
in “the desirable emotional responses evoked in the 
player, when she interacts with the game system.” 
(2004). Through user functions, the reader interacts at 
the aesthetics level, discovers the dynamics but is 
normally not able to burrow into the level of 
mechanics. 
With dynamic and varying outputs that are largely 
unknown both to the author and the reader, we may 
consider the aesthetic value of interaction. Katja 
Kwastek notes how in data-intensive artefacts, 
readers may “seek to activate all the available assets” 
(2013, p. 114) in order to achieve a sense of 
completeness, used as they are to linearity and 
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completion in other media, and wanting to 
“experience the ‘whole’ of a work” (2013, p. 114). In 
process-intensive artefacts, completeness may be 
found in exhausting the algorithmic possibilities for 
interaction, with the focus shifting from traditional 
aesthetics to one of interaction and performance 
(Ribas, 2014a), from an Aristotelian to a rhizomatic 
idea of perfection.  
This is particularly noticeable when readers are not 
engaged directly with the artefact but rather observe 
others during their interactions, in a situation of 
“vicarious interaction” (Levin, 2010). In these cases 
“sensual or cognitive comprehension can still take 
place”, and the observer may discover “relations 
between action and effect, even if he is not actively 
involved” (Kwastek, 2013, p. 94). A vicarious 
interactor does not develop the same experience as 
an active interactor, but is “able to observe and 
understand interaction processes that he would not 
have carried out” (Kwastek, 2013, p. 94), and even to 
aesthetically consider the performance of the 
interactor (Zielinski, 2006, p. 138). 
The three positions identified by Aarseth (1997, p. 
135) for human-machine collaboration – pre-, co-, 
and post-processing – require direct human-
computer interaction. Likewise, his definition of 
ergodic text (and any definition of ergodic artefact 
based in it) also requires interaction. Given this, any 
non-interactive media, even if processor-based, may 
be difficult to classify as ergodic. In non-interactive 
artefacts – or non-interactive states of otherwise 
interactive systems – the reader may apparently be 
limited to the interpretative function and barred from 
developing any of the other functions that are 
necessary to the definition. We however propose that 
a broader, procedural understanding of the nature of 
the interpretative function, can allow us to consider 
the experience of these systems as ergodic. 
2 | WHAT THEN HAPPENS WHEN INTERACTION IS NOT 
POSSIBLE? 
While interacting vicariously, one may be able to intuit 
the mechanical principles of a system, and thus start 
inferring causal relations. By observing both the 
system’s and the interactant’s behaviours, one may 
identify regularities and patterns that lead us to expect 
specific reactions from both parties. We may question 
whether a full understanding of the artefact’s 
mechanics may be attained through this or any other 
means, including direct interaction, as long as direct 
access to the code is not allowed, but we may expect 
that if the outputs of the artefact exhibit any regularity 
and if their behaviour is somewhat determinable 
(Carvalhais, 2010, p. 363), the reader may be able to 
develop a working model of the system that is 
capable of producing useful predictions regarding its 
behaviours or those of the interactant-system pair. 
This model may of course be based on false 
assumptions, or on the adaptation of familiar 
behaviours from other systems, but if it is 
demonstrably effective, it will be useful to the reader, 
and will allow her to approach completeness in the 
experience of the system. Therefore, as a result of 
vicarious interaction, the reader may be able to peer 
through a system’s aesthetics level, developing 
hypotheses about dynamics and ultimately about 
mechanics. What then happens when interaction is 
not possible? 
When reading a system with which one is unable to 
interact with, in order to achieve a comprehension of 
its procedural level and behaviour, one needs to 
surpass the traditional scope of the interpretative 
function. Besides the interpretation of text, images, 
sounds and other signs, procedural systems offer the 
possibility of developing a procedural interpretation. 
When interpreting texts, readers form and develop 
hypothesis, confirm, modify or abandon predictions 
(Douglas, 1994, p. 175). A similar process may be 
developed at the procedural level. 
When perceiving a system and following its outputs, a 
reader is not capable of directly accessing the 
prescriptive rules at the level of mechanics, but she is 
able to make use of descriptive rules to create models 
that intend to explain or understand the 
phenomenological levels of the experience. While 
registering affordances on the artefact’s outputs, the 
reader gradually identifies patterns of behaviour and 
relations between the perceived system and other 
systems or artefacts in the world. Using the data thus 
gathered the reader is then able to develop mental 
simulations of the processes behind the surface units 
found in the artefact’s outputs. The reader probes the 
level of mechanics, constructing hypotheses that are 
verifiable at the level of dynamics and allow the fine-
tuning of the mental models. 
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These models do not need to be based on complete 
sets of data, and they do not even need to generate 
precise predictions of the system’s behaviours. They 
need to pose testable hypothesis that can be verified 
by the system’s behaviours, being eventually replaced 
by hypothesis that ultimately may contribute to a 
better working model of the system. And while the 
system continues under observation, this trial and 
error process will be continuously developed. 
This process of gradually understating a system from 
which the reader only has inferred clues is analogous 
to the process of developing theories of mind of other 
humans or of human-like entities [3]. A theory of mind 
allows one to simulate the mental states and 
processes of others, and to picture “the world from 
another person’s vantage point”, constructing “a 
mental model of another person’s complex thoughts 
and intentions in order to predict and manipulate 
[their] behavior.” (Ramachandran, 2011, loc. 2281) 
Based on known humans, familiar systems or 
mechanics, but also on other artefacts, and 
phenomena from the physical world, etc., humans 
speculate regarding mental processes, developing 
hypotheses that are confirmed or falsified based on 
the witnessed actions. 
Through the developed simulations, and still from the 
stance of the reader, one tries to see the system from 
the designer’s point of view, embracing its wholeness 
and fully understanding it. Interactive systems are 
plastic and need to be interacted with in order to be 
experienced and understood. Non-interactive 
systems, or systems in non-interactive states, do not 
allow the user to investigate them through interaction, 
but mental simulations developed by the user are far 
more plastic, versatile, and accessible. They allow for 
transformations or variations, and for a larger space of 
possibilities to be explored as the reader develops a 
theory of the system, a process during which, they are 
not engaged with the artefact’s diegesis or with a 
fiction, but rather try “to master its routines” 
(Kirkpatrick, 2011, p. 8). 
The process of validating the model can then be seen 
as leading the reader through an experience of 
traversal punctuated by epiphanies and aporias — 
when hypotheses are confirmed or disconfirmed — 
which may lead to the development of narrative 
(Aarseth, 1997, p. 92) and even of drama in artefacts 
that wouldn’t otherwise be experienced as narrative 
(Carvalhais, 2012a, 2013). Furthermore, epiphanies 
will activate the reward centres of the reader’s brain, 
resulting in pleasurable experiences that will drive the 
enjoyment of the artefact and of its simulation. 
3 | ERGODIC CONTEMPLATION 
We may thus propose that non-interactive systems, or 
systems in non-interactive states, in spite of being 
limited to the interpretative user function, may also be 
ergodic. The mental exploration and reconfiguration of 
analogues — or simulations — of the systems can be 
a de facto ergodic experience, therefore procedural 
works are not limited to a classic interpretation, as 
their procedural nature allows for a new level of 
virtuosic interpretation that while seemingly 
contemplative is actually very active. As with other 
ergodic forms, procedural artefacts require the 
development of a nontrivial effort from the reader in 
order to find not one but many paths along the 
traversal of the procedural space of possibilities. 
In the ergodic forms studied by Aarseth the reader is 
“constantly reminded of inaccessible strategies and 
paths not taken” (1997, p. 3), with each decision 
making parts of the content more or less accessible 
and building up uncertainty regarding the result of 
one’s choices and to what may or may not be missed 
along the traversal. In procedural artefacts the 
questions posed by the reader point towards how 
many and how diverse those paths may be, and to a 
discovery of how the system tends to follow them. As 
a result of ergodic contemplation one is then led not 
to build up uncertainty but rather to increase 
information and knowledge regarding the artefacts 
mechanics and to regard the possibilities to be 
discovered at the dynamics and aesthetics levels. 
If in ergodic forms the reader already faces a risk of 
rejection (Aarseth, 1997, p. 4), in procedural artefacts 
they also face the added risk of incomprehension, of 
being unable to develop a working theory of the 
system that may lead to useful predictions. Naturally, 
with the exception of the very simplest of systems, a 
total understanding of the processes is not only 
unattainable as it is utopian, and the reader should be 
reconciled with that. 
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4 | DESIGNING FOR VIRTUOSIC INTERPRETATION 
While developing procedural systems, artists and 
designers need to be aware that much of this process 
of building models and testing hypotheses is 
developed unconsciously. A conscious procedural 
close reading is certainly possible but in most cases 
— with perhaps the exception of game forms — 
should not be expected. We are therefore faced with 
the difficulty of communicating processes, or of 
designing processes that may be discovered by 
readers. 
Code descriptions, procedural descriptions or even 
explicit code may be presented either at or with the 
system. These may duly inform the reader and allow 
for the easier elaboration of models and predictions. 
An example of this approach may be found in John F. 
Simon Jr.’s Every Icon, a work presented with the 
following text: 
Given: A 32 X 32 Grid 
Allowed: Any element of the grid to be black 
or white 
Shown: Every Icon 
(Simon, 1997) 
More recently, C.E.B. Reas has developed several 
works in his Process series that are presented with 
textual descriptions of the elements in the pieces from 
which dynamic compositions emerge. Elements are 
“machines” composed by forms (as e.g. “Circle”, 
“Line”) and one or more behaviours (such as “Move in 
a straight line”, “Constrain to surface”, “Change 
direction while touching another Element”, etc.). Each 
piece in the series is a process that “defines an 
environment for Elements and determines how the 
relationships between the Elements are visualized” 
and that is presented as “a short text that defines a 
space to explore through multiple interpretations.” 
(Reas, 2008). As an example, we may present: 
Process 18 
A rectangular surface filled with instances of 
Element 5, each with a different size and gray 
value. Draw a quadrilateral connecting the 
endpoints of each pair of Elements that are 
touching. Increase the opacity of the 
quadrilateral while the Elements are touching 
and decrease while they are not.  
(Reas, 2008) 
Finally, explicit code may be found in “program code 
poetry” (Cramer, 2001), of which the works in Pall 
Thayer’s Microcodes (2009-2014) series are good 
examples: 
Sleep 




If code or procedural descriptions are not presented, 
processes may be designed with repetition and (some 
amount) of regularity in mind. As an example, 
algorithmic processes that largely depend on pseudo-
randomness may dissimulate their structure and 
processes under extremes of disorder that are far off 
from a readable and understandable level of effective 
complexity (Galanter, 2003, p. 8; 2008; Lloyd, 2006). 
A balance of repetition and novelty — to which 
randomness can certainly contribute (Leong et al., 
2008) — can ease deduction, comprehension, and 
the following of processes, as well as (to a certain 
extent) the participation of the reader in the 
processes.  
Finally, and as Steve Reich notes in Music as a 
Gradual Process (1968), perceptible and gradual 
processes facilitate the closely detailed reading of a 
piece, helping to connect compositional processes 
and sounding music. The pacing of the processes 
may be instrumental in facilitating ergodic 
interpretation, or allowing it altogether, and we should 
bear in mind that the timescales of modern 
computational devices and of human psychology and 
perception are very different. 
But processes should also be developed taking into 
account a series of perils or difficulties related to 
human interpretation of procedural systems — both 
natural and artificial — as e.g. being aware of 
psychological and perceptual illusions such as the 
Eliza effect [4] (Hofstadter, 1995, p. 158) and the Tale-
Spin effect [5]. The mental processes supporting 
some of these illusions should also be taken into 
account during development: patternicity [6], “the 
tendency to find meaningful patterns in both 
meaningful and meaningless data” and agenticity, “the 
tendency to infuse patterns with meaning, intention, 
and agency” (Shermer, 2011, p. 5). 
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5 | CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We should regard the interpretative user function as 
broader and more relevant to the aesthetic experience 
than what one may be led to believe from its usual 
association with non-ergodic forms. Procedural 
interpretation may allow the development of rough 
analogues of the explorative and configurative 
functions, when these are not present or are not 
possible in a given context, and lead to the transfer of 
algorithmic processes between the artefact and the 
reader and to the development of a virtuosic 
interpretation.  
An awareness of these processes may thus lead 
creators to develop artefacts that may rely on them or 
at least aesthetically negotiate with them, so if from 
traditional aesthetics we move to an aesthetics of 
interaction, agency and performance, we now find 
these also coupled with a very relevant aesthetics of 
process and procedurality. This paper establishes the 
need for this awareness, enumerating some 
recommendations for the design of the ergodic 
experience of virtuosic interpretation, while in the 
future we aim to expand and uncover new 
considerations, and to develop them into a formal set 
of principles and guidelines. 
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ENDNOTES 
[1] Among the possible and often confusing 
designations — user, reader, spectator, player, 
interactor, etc. — we will use reader, albeit 
recognizing that this also describes a particular mode 
of engagement with a medium or artefact. 
[2] Hunicke, LeBlanc and Zubek’s MDA framework 
was developed as a formal approach for studying 
videogames, an undoubtedly ergodic form. MDA has 
been previously used by ourselves (Carvalhais, 2012b) 
and other authors (Ribas, 2014b; 2012) to study 
interactive and ergodic media forms. 
[3] The capacity to develop theories of mind is not 
exclusive to humans and not only developed towards 
humans but also towards entities or systems that may 
exhibit behaviours, emotions or “mental states” 
comparable to those witnessed in humans (Zunshine, 
2006; Ramachandran, 2011), with “many of us even 
project[ing] this onto objects.” (Gazzaniga, 2011, p. 
158). 
[4] The Eliza effect is “…defined as the susceptibility of 
people to read far more understanding than is 
warranted into strings of symbols – especially words – 
strung together by computers. (…) We don’t confuse 
what electric eyes do with genuine vision. But when 
things get only slightly more complicated, people get 
far more confused – and very rapidly, too.” 
(Hofstadter, 1995, p. 158). 
[5] “A very complex programming process is 
reproduced in such a simplified form that the 
complexity remains concealed from the recipient. 
Wardrip-Fruin’s name for this effect refers to a 1970s 
story-generating computer program whose highly 
complex algorithms could not be discerned by the 
users.” (Kwastek, 2013, p. 135). 
[6] This phenomenon is also known as apophenia. 
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